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RECOVERING FROM TRUST BREAKDOWNS IN LARGE SYSTEM  
IMPLEMENTATIONS 
Bjarne Rerup Schlichter* brs@asb.dk 
Povl Erik Rostgaard Andersen* 
 
*Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus University, Denmark 
Abstract  
On the basis of experiences from the Faroese large-scale implementation of integrated healthcare 
information systems and insights into dynamic aspects of trust, we offer the following lessons learned for the 
successful management and recovery of trust (breakdowns) in large system implementations: restore 
relations by turning towards face-to-face events and procedures, assure a well-functioning and available 
support organization, demonstrate trust in actors to enhance their own self-confidence and celebrate 
successes, even the smallest or ones injected by yourself. The propositions are based on a 6-year 
longitudinal qualitative case study and analyzed using critical incidents and content analysis. The 
propositions were discussed in a seminar with project participants. Finally the findings are challenged and 
sharpened and suggestions for further research are given. 
Keywords: Trust, Implementation, Breakdown, Recovery, Prescriptive findings, Healthcare  
1 INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Aspects of trust during information systems implementation projects have been recognised as important and 
the presence of a high level of trust among project participants is seen as a critical success factor that must be 
fulfilled to reach the goals of the project (Gefen, 2004). Even though many authors have addressed what trust 
is and the consequences of a lack of trust between actors, not many have included trust relations between 
actors and the project as such – and even fewer have been prescriptive, giving actual recommendations for 
how to recover from trust breakdowns. On the basis of an analysis of the dynamic aspects of trust during a 
major Faroese implementation of an integrated healthcare information system (IHIS), it is concluded that it is 
beneficial to take direct action to meet three criteria: to focus on how to keep the project in a trustworthy 
state; to take actions to let actors meet face to face or face a relevant version of the IT system; and to keep 
the actors’ self-confidence on a high level.  
The paper will develop a number of prescriptive pieces of advice on how to recover from trust breakdowns 
in large implementations of information technology systems. The paper is organised as follows. After the 
research approach the context of trust (breakdowns) is presented by recapitulating fundamental aspects of 
trust, by introducing the case and by accounting for three incidents of trust breakdowns and recovery, thus 
classifying the incidents. Then the incidents are analysed, which leads to the prescriptive advice and a 
recommendation for how to identify trust breakdowns and initiate the related recovery actions. The final 
section concludes with some implications for future research and practice. 
As trust perceptions are subjective phenomena this study follows an interpretative qualitative approach 
(Walsham, 1993). The study was based on a systematic data collection strategy that included multiple data 
sources, semi-structured data collection and electronic data recording and transcription. It relied on 3 
empirical sources: participant observation, individual semi-structured interviews with all levels of the 
organisation and document studies. In this longitudinal study 17 actors, selected to represent the principal 
IHIS project stakeholders, were interviewed twice a year from the summer of 2005 until early 2009 to 
balance frequent collection of interviews with practical needs for clustering interviewing around fixed point 
in time – and for convenience due the efficiency. The first slice of interviews was done just after signing of 
the implementation contract before the actual implantation commenced, where the last slice was done during 
the final implementation of last ward at the main hospital. By using a longitudinal approach it is possible to 
follow the development of trust over time. 
The empirical analysis was conducted in a three-stage process using content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004), 
supplemented by critical incident analysis (Flanagan, 1954). The first stage aimed at developing an 
understanding of the empirical materials through the lens of modernity and trust (Giddens, 1990; Schlichter 
& Rose, 2009), while the second stage was concerned with understanding the dynamic elements of trust in 
the specific context (Strauss & Corbin, 1994; Schlichter & Rose, 2009). In the third stage, which is reported 
in the present paper, normative aspects from the theory of critical success factors (Francoise et al, 2009) 
structured the formation of prescriptive recommendations (Gregor, 2006) for how to recover from trust 
breakdowns. The recommendations were challenged and structured during a workshop with academics and 
practitioners from the case organisation in late March 2010.  
 
Figure 1: Methodology 
 
Figure 1 above provides an overview of the methodology used in the paper. Based on more than 50 semi 
structured interviews, participant observation and document studies, the narrative of three trust breakdowns 
were written. The breakdowns are summarised in table 1: “Incidents”. By reading the narrative, positive as 
well as negative trust conditions and consequences were identified (and “marked” with a letter to assure 
Interviews 
1 
2 
3 
Table 1: 
Incidents 
Table 3: 
Positive 
condition
Lesson 1 
….. 
…... 
Lesson 5 
CSF 4 
P1 
P2 
P3 
P4 
List 1: 
4 recovery 
propositions 
Seminar, 
statement
Narritive 
Table 2: 
Negative 
condtion
 
 
intervention
forward and backward traceability) and placed in tables 2 and 3. Then the interventions used to “change” 
(“recover” from) the negative to the positive trust conditions were identified in the narrative. The narrative, 
the related trust conditions and consequences and the interventions were then presented and challenged at a 
seminar with a broad representation of actors leading to feedback consisting of more than 30 comments and 
suggestions. Finally 4 propositions for trust recovery were derived from the analysis.  
 
2 THE CONTEXT OF TRUST 
The author was involved as an observer when the project was planned and during the full implementation 
period from 2005 until 2010. The main purpose of the involvement was to understand and identify what trust 
was in this context and how dynamic aspects of trust could be explained. Even though the implementation 
project faced huge problems, the management succeeded in achieving the goals and the IHIS is now (spring 
2010) fully functional in both the primary and the secondary healthcare sectors. In the following text three 
incidents in which the project was challenged by declining levels of trust are described.  
A letter in parentheses, e.g. “(A)”, indicate a point in the text to which reference is made at a later stage 
during the analysis, where (letters+number) refers to interviews done: 
CD:  Consulting Doctor   nn: Interview Number  
NUR: Nurse    PM: Project Manager 
CIO: Chief Information Officer DM: Deputy Minister 
HD: Hospital Director  GP: General Practitioner 
2.1 Trust 
Trust studies are a well-established part of the information systems literature and play an important role in 
three principal enquiry domains: 
 eCommerce; customer’s trust in the vendor is understood to be an important factor in the decision to buy 
 virtual organizations, teams and communities; trust between individuals is influential in the collaboration     
 relationship 
 inter-organizational systems; organizational co-operation is dependent on trust 
The presence of trust is widely understood as a critical success factor (CSF: Bullen & Rockart, 1981) for the 
achievement of the successful implementation of information systems (Somers & Nelson, 2001; Akkermans 
& Helden, 2002; Sun et al, 2005; Schlichter, 2010).  
Trust can be understood as  
 a process (Komiak & Benbasat 2008); it can be established, built, lost, regained over time;  
 an individualized continuum. This means that trust levels can vary (trust can break down and be 
restored), and that individual actors can have different trust levels at the same time (Schlichter 2010) or 
 as trust in an organizational system (Lowe and Locke 2008). 
According to Gefen (2004), trust (in the context of an implementation project) is ‘the belief that others upon 
whom one depends, yet has little control over, will not take advantage of the situation by behaving in an 
opportunistic manner but, rather, will fulfil their expected commitments by behaving ethically, dependably 
and fairly, especially under conditions involving risk and potential loss’. Trust is furthermore shown to have 
positive consequences by having influence on co-operation and commitment between actors (Rajiv 1999; 
Salam, Iyer et al. 2001), reduces complexity (Lander et al 2004) and is crucial to establishing positive results 
during implementation (Scott and Kaindl 2000; Somers and Nelson 2001; Lander, Purvis et al. 2004; Wang 
and Chen 2006). Trust is ‘important for ERP customization clients in determining their assessment of the 
relationship with the vendor, because the customization of such complex software typically entails 
vulnerability and dependence on the vendor’(Gefen 2004,p266) . Successful implementation of ERP systems 
‘requires a corporate culture that emphasizes the value of sharing common goals over individual pursuits and 
the value of trust between partners, employees, managers and corporations’ (Somers and Nelson 2001). The 
consequences of lack of trust can be severe; as problems and delays mount, trust relations become strained - 
leading to a circle of suspicion and disbelief which is both destructive and hard to break out of (Gefen 2004; 
Nah and Delgado 2006; Schlichter & Rose 2009). When trust does not exist in an implementation project, 
much effort must be directed into control, regulation and documentation.  
The understanding of trust in this literature is also primarily taxonomic - trust is a property with different 
facets or categories. Trust is deterrence-based, knowledge-based or identification-based (Lander et al 2004); 
process-based, characteristic-based or institution-based (Gefen 2004); mutual, cognitive or swift (Scott and 
Kaindl, 2000). If trust is an important component of implementation success, but absent, then trust should be 
created. Various mechanisms for establishing trust are considered, including initial interactions, integrity, 
predictability, communication, sharing control, concern for others, joint identification, commitment, 
potential for success, and managerial decisions (Lander, Purvis et al. 2004). Trust can be built up with 
intensive communication, coaching, delegation of responsibility, personal care and attention (Jarrar, Al-
Mudimigh et al. 2000). Building trust quickly in temporary project situations is considered important 
(Lander, Purvis et al. 2004), and customization companies need to behave responsively and to act in 
accordance with their clients’ expectations (Gefen 2002). The present paper develops concrete 
recommendations on how to re-build trust. 
2.2 The Faroese IHIS project  
This section presents a narrative of the case. The narrative is a synthesis of all the existing documents and 
interviews and has been through a set of discussions both among the authors and during reflective meetings 
with the actors interviewed, leading to revisions. Letters in parentheses indicate a reference to the trust 
conditions and consequences in tables 2 and 3.  
The Faroe Islands are a self-governing part of the Danish National Community with 48,000 inhabitants 
distributed across 18 small islands. They lie in the North Atlantic Ocean between the Shetlands and Iceland, 
with one-third of the inhabitants living in the capital, Torshavn. In total 3 hospitals and 27 general 
practitioners (GPs) report to the Ministry of Health. General practitioners are self-employed, but work in 
clinics supplied by the local authorities. They invoice private sickness benefit associations and co-operate 
with the hospitals. Discussions about establishing an integrated healthcare information system, with the 
purpose of modernising and integrating the Faroese healthcare system, began in 2000. A contract with a 
supplier was signed on 3 November 2004, after feasibility studies and planning. The project was discussed in 
the Faroese parliament, and the involvement of local IT firms sought. The implementation project is one of 
the largest IT projects ever in the Faroese public sector, involving the complete healthcare system throughout 
the community. Implementation commenced in January 2005, with completion planned for the end of 2006; 
however, the project ran into difficulties and has been rescheduled several times. In March 2010 it was 
expected that the IHIS would be in use in all 3 hospitals and by all the GPs. 
The ministry contracted an external consultant as the project manager and in mid-2005 recruited a Chief 
Information Officer (CIO). A project charter and group were established, and a series of information and 
configuration meetings were held. Two pilot wards configured and installed the IHIS, and under the 
guidance of the supplier’s project manager, the core system was finally configured during the spring of 2006. 
A major roll-out was planned. In the second half of the year the surgical ward succeeded in configuring parts 
of the system to its needs. In early 2007 the IHIS was implemented in the emergency ward at the National 
Hospital, where GPs could experience it, and a few adopted it in their own practices. In September 2007 the 
core system was formally taken over by the Faroese healthcare authorities and a party was thrown to 
celebrate (U). The ministry bought a laboratory information system, a blood bank system and a digital x-ray 
system to be integrated with the IHIS system.  
A full account of the case is given in Schlichter (2010). 
2.3 Incidents 
The initiatives occurred in different parts of the implementation project. The differences were analysed to 
understand each initiative’s unique profile regarding breakdown and recovery, and named to illustrate the 
main problems to handle.  
2.3.1 Challenged workshops 
One of the first activities in the implementation project was a series of configuration workshops with the 
participation of healthcare professionals (doctors, nurses and secretaries), representatives from the project 
organisation (project managers and technicians) and consultants from the supplier. The purpose of the 
workshops was to provide the Faroese staff with an initial understanding of the IT system’s structure and 
capabilities, to perform the initial configuration to localise (B) the system to the Faroese healthcare structure 
and to create a foundation for the specific implementation and set-up at the individual wards and other 
organisational structures. The workshops brought together many of the important actors from the project. 
However, not all of the workshops were regarded as suitable for bringing the project forward by the local 
actors. The workshops neither led to the desired result nor were executed in an effective manner: “it was not 
all workshops that worked – often we missed healthcare insight by the consultants” (CEO-19).  
It was claimed that the consultants did not have sufficient healthcare background (A), that they were un-
prepared and that they mainly had a technical background. However, it was also recognised that the users 
participating in these workshops had a very low insight into the nature of information systems (A): “They did 
not have any knowledge of computers – only been on a very short introductory course” (NUR-21) and it 
seemed that a very large amount of configuration was needed (B). These issues led to workshops where the 
Faroese actors could not understand what was going on (A), and were ready to leave the project because they 
could not see how the goals of the project could ever be reached with the amount of resources allocated to 
the project (D): “I believe this requires more resources than available – and foreseen” (HD-24). 
During the workshops  major part of the actors also questioned the IHIS’s influence on issues such as 
privacy and security, but received no actual feedback on these issues (E): “A lot of rumors were around 
about lack of privacy and security – could a reasonable level be reached?” (PM-20). The IHIS as such also 
seemed unstable and difficult to use (C) with no assistance (helpdesk) available: “… everything gets 
registered in the journal – it is not at all to understand …” and “we do not know where to get assistance 
easy” (CD-22). 
After a couple of less successful workshops the supplier decided to change the approach of the workshops, 
firstly by appointing consultants with healthcare experience to manage the workshops (Q) and secondly by 
letting their own consultants take care of a larger part of the initial set-up than planned (O, R). At the same 
time a CIO was appointed for the first time to head the information systems in the Department of Health. 
One of the first actions by the CIO was to agree with the supplier to establish a so-called “sandbox” (O, Q), 
where the future end-users could try to set up and configure an almost fully functioning replica of the IHIS, 
thus being able to become acquainted with the system by working with a “real” IT system instead of only 
abstract paperwork (P, R).  
2.3.2 Slow progress 
After the successful recovery from the initial workshops the hard work began to configure the IHIS 
according to the actual situation and (maybe) re-engineer the working procedures at the wards. Based on 
what was learnt by super users (representing the end-users) and a few centrally placed IT people during the 
initial workshops, the idea was that the actors on the Faroese side of the implementation project should be 
able to configure the information system themselves with only minor support from the supplier. They should 
“work on their own”, which was more difficult than foreseen (G); it was especially difficult to match (or 
adapt) the built routines of the IHIS with what was actually happening on the wards: “We have worked a lot 
to configure the system and it was an enormous effort to match the system with our processes” (CIO-33). 
During the delayed process of configuration some issues emerged. First of all it now seemed impossible to 
finalise the implementation of the first wards according to the planned schedule (F). Next the group of actors 
performing the configuration also found technical problems (“bugs”) in the software (C) and mismatches 
between the software delivered and the requirements from the contract (B), especially related to privacy 
issues (E) and payment procedures (G): “My main requirement as GP was to be able to issue invoices and 
prescriptions  but I have had problems to communicate with other users, system failures, crashes and so on” 
(GP-14).  
When the group experienced these problems they could not gain timely assistance since no support 
organisation was in place (C). The supplier claimed that the only way to solve these issues was to upgrade 
the standard software to a new version, leading to the often-seen problems when upgrading software during 
an implementation process. The stressful mix of discussions on who should pay for the costs related to 
delays (F) and upgrades and the heavy delay to the project caused (F) worried discussions among all the 
actors on the future of the project; had the authorities entered a project that could be neither finalised nor 
fully financed (D)? “It is factual that the project is though for the participants. For this reason you can feel 
fed up with it; that it goes on forever and no results are met” (PM-31). 
All these issues called for heavy actions to re-establish trust among all the actors. The executive management 
decided to take a “time out” and a meeting was set up in Denmark with the participation of the project 
managers and lawyers from the parties, an external consultant and deputy directors (O): “It was a nice 
meeting. I felt the air was cleansed and the process revitalized. Some results were the question of up-grade 
and who should pay for extra work” (DM-028).  
As a result of the meeting the suppliers’ project manager was replaced with a more experienced person who 
had also been a part of the initial pre-analysis phase; a full-time configuration consultant was deployed to the 
Faroe Islands for a period of time; and principles of the issue of splitting the cost were agreed. During her 
stay the configuration consultant was able to balance the IHIS to the professional needs of the end-users (Q, 
P). The deployed consultant took part in the initial phase to set up a local support organisation with related 
procedures (R): “… she [the consultant] took leadership in the configuration and to set up procedures related 
to maintenance, support, helpdesk and so on” (PM-043).  
2.3.3 Squeezed core actors  
With assistance from the configuration consultant the full span of the core parts of the IHIS was in place. 
The Faroese healthcare authorities now had an IHIS fully localised in their own organisation and ready to be 
implemented at the different wards. The core configured system was formally tested, accepted and taken 
over, which was celebrated (U) by speeches and partying: “… earlier this year we took over the system 
because we have got the deliveries bought. We showed our joy by a huge party – the participants reacted 
quite positive on this” (CIO-33).  
A new group of coming end-users (super users) was now activated to act as local representatives in the 
ongoing implementation process (T).  
As almost all the wards (and specialities) were now activated, the workload of the Faroese project manager 
became greater and greater (D). The project manager should also take care of the more technical aspects of 
the implementation, such as the IT infrastructure as well as supervising the high number of locally placed 
super users (I). The super users felt squeezed between their (normal, daily) roles as nurses and secretaries 
and being a formal part of the project organisation (H): “… yes, the relations are worn. The originally group 
is gone, exists no more. The new group has to be trained. That’s a huge task – and suddenly one more shows 
up” (NUR-42).  
Both the PM and the super users felt that the workload and the amount of conflicts (I) were far too high and 
lost their trust in their own abilities to fulfil their obligations. This was underpinned by the fact that the 
funding for compensating the end-users for their participation in the implementation project was quickly 
fading away (D). It was in this period of time that the end-users really experienced the new IHIS and how the 
implementation of it formalised and institutionalised the life at the wards (J) and that the end-users 
experienced problems and flows in their daily use of the IHIS: “… it is a natural part of the implementation 
process. They have to decide on changes in workflows. Some will have to spend more time before the 
screen, some will face challenges to change into something unknown as flows disappear and new are 
established” (CIO044).  
During this phase of the project the PM resigned and a major part of the super users decided to cancel their 
participation in the implementation.  
The situation was once more serious and something had to be done to rescue the project. A new time out was 
taken during which the project was heavily rescheduled, new funding was granted and a new PM with 
experience of working with organisational changes and development (O, Q) at the hospital was hired. Also, it 
was decided to employ new super users (P, T) in the project and physically place these in the Department of 
Health together with the other IT staff and central parts of the implementation project (H,O,T): “They [the 
project staff] were moved up into the Department of Health. Four coordinators in all – they became an 
integrated part of the project implementation organisation. Actually this led to more resources and a more 
agile organisation” (CIO-44). 
The centrally placed staff began to celebrate their progress at their morning breakfast meetings each time 
they made progress together with end-users and when they reported progress to the steering committee (U).  
2.4 Consequences of breakdowns 
Table 1 accumulates the immediate observations of breakdowns and the actual actions taken in the project 
seen in the text above. For each of the three incidents we show what was observed, the action taken by the 
project and which aspect was in focus during the actions. 
 
Table 1: Three trust breakdown incidents 
Incident Observation Action Focus on 
(1) Challenged 
workshops 
Inexperienced consultants 
IT system not really ready for 
configuration 
Consultants replaced 
Sandbox established 
Actors’ satisfactory 
meeting with the 
project 
(2) Slow progress Lack of functionality 
Only minor progress of configuration  
Dispute regarding payment of “extras” 
Core IT system upgraded 
Consultants deployed 
Meeting among managers 
arranged 
Maintain momentum  
Save the project 
The “effective” project 
(3) Squeezed core 
actors 
Core participants squeezed between roles 
and feeling lonely at wards 
Very high workload and doubt regarding 
roles and own qualifications 
PM resigns 
Place core staff together 
Establish meetings at wards 
Reschedule to a realistic 
plan 
Employ a PM with hospital 
experience 
Deteriorating self-
confidence of the 
project manager and 
other central staff 
 
3 THE CONSEQUENCES OF TRUST CONDITIONS 
Above we saw examples of incidents in the project related to the breakdown of trust. Different situations of 
breakdowns and recovery actions were presented. To identify explicitly the consequences of the breakdowns, 
the interviews were analysed to locate statements and stories related to the three breakdowns. For each 
incident we identified and consolidated the negative trust condition (understood as the qualities of the 
situation observed) and the consequences of the negative trust condition. Please refer to table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Negative trust conditions and consequences 
R
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Negative trust condition 
 
 
 
Negative trust consequence 
 
 
Reference in 
text to 
“incidents” 
from the case 
1 IT immaturity amongst users and/or  
low insight into the actual IHIS or Faroese 
context by the consultants 
Suspicion of the new system, insecurity, 
unwillingness to collaborate 
A 
12 
 
Standardised IHIS built for a different context 
and needing much configuration 
Lack of confidence in the system and system 
supplier, forced work practice changes and 
workarounds 
B 
12 
 
Usability and operational difficulties with 
IHIS 
Lack of confidence in the system, slow learning 
curve, work disruption 
C 
123 Resource shortages Lack of confidence in the achievement of project 
goals 
D 
 2 Greater transparency of digitalised 
information in IHIS 
Worry about accountability, privacy, surveillance E 
 2 Project delays Lack of confidence in schedules and deadlines, 
lack of a sense of urgency in the progressing 
project 
F 
 23 Dissatisfaction with implementation by users Breakdown of project staff morale G 
  3 Absence of a prior relationship between IT 
professionals and users 
Need to establish trust relations, limited social 
capital, limited tolerance of divergent viewpoints 
H 
  3 Many diverse stakeholder groups Communication difficulties, interest conflicts, 
cognitive overload especially for project staff 
I 
  3 Formalisation and institutionalisation of work 
practice and documentation (medical 
journals) 
Suspicion of management control, insecurity over 
own practice, adaptation and change difficulties 
J 
 
From table 2 it can be seen that a specific trust condition (e.g. “resource shortages”) can relate to more than 
one incident of trust breakdown. 
Table 3 below provides a list of positive trust conditions and related consequences as seen after trust was re-
established in the three trust breakdown incidents. References are given to: 1) the negative trust condition(s) 
that is (are) “solved” when the positive trust condition is achieved and 2) the text in the narrative where the 
positive condition can be located.  
Table 3: Positive trust conditions and consequences after intervention and related to negative trust 
conditions 
Negative trust 
condition 
Related positive trust condition after 
intervention 
Related 
positive trust consequence 
Reference 
to case  
A C E   I Increase in the quantity and quality of 
personal contact with and between actors 
Better communication between 
stakeholders with diverse interests, 
increased social capital 
O 
A   E    J Many opportunities for users to 
experience the IHIS 
Confidence in own ability to understand 
and negotiate the system and incorporate 
it into own work routines 
P 
 B    G  J Emerging work benefits through the use 
of the IHIS 
Confidence in the system’s ability to 
contribute work advantages that outweigh 
the teething troubles and start-up 
difficulties 
Q 
A C  F Rapid and flexible response to user 
support 
Confidence in the project group’s ability 
to know and hear users and act on their 
behalf 
R 
 BC Tailoring of IHIS to users’ work routines Confidence in the project group’s ability 
to understand local medical work routines 
and adapt the system accordingly 
S 
   D F H  Restructured and better-resourced project 
organisation 
Internal project confidence and role 
security, better communication with users 
T 
   D  G Repeated small project successes Confidence in the ability of the project to 
meet its goals, despite setbacks and delays  
U 
 
4 THE MANAGEMENT OF TRUST 
The Faroese implementation project survived the five years of struggling and managed to recover many 
times from serious trust breakdowns. Many reasons exist for this. Our analysis suggests, however, that 
substantive parts of the breakdowns could have been avoided by being proactive and adopting more 
appropriate recovery tactics at earlier points in time. 
The narrative of the Faroese IHIS implementation project, including the observations of negative and 
positive trust conditions and consequences (as documented in tables 2 and 3), was presented in a half-day 
seminar in March 2010. The seminar had the participation of representatives from hospital management, 
doctors, nurses and secretaries as well as high-level management from the Ministry of Health (cabinet 
minister, deputy minister and department chairs) and from the supplier. During the seminar the participants 
developed more than 30 recommendations for concrete actions to be taken to move from a negative to a 
positive trust condition in the presented trust breakdowns. By critically reading, analysing and discussing the 
narrative and the recommendations, 4 propositions on how to recover from trust breakdowns emerge. For 
each proposition the related set of actions is shown with supportive citations from the seminar.  
The first proposition is about how to (re-)establish better communication and achieve internal project 
confidence and role security:   
(1) When trust disappears or is reaching a low level arrange physical face-to-face meetings and re-
establish trust by physically placing core team members in the same location.  
As we see in the case, trust in the successful completion of the project can often be restored be letting the 
actors meet face to face around project activities (references O and T in the narrative). During the seminar 
many statements such as: “Let them work together and meet each other” and “Let the resource persons from 
the initial implementations stay within the frame of the project to learn and develop themselves” were given 
by high as well as lower management.  
The second proposition addresses the question of support to the people’s participation in the implementation 
project.  
(2) The actors should meet and use realistic data and procedures in the system from their first experience 
with it and must continuously have access to a support organisation where they can gain qualified 
help at the level where they are at that specific moment in the project.  
When the actors have good experiences of using or meeting the information technology system as such, an 
effective base for the re-establishment and maintenance of their belief in the success of the implementation 
project is present (references O, P, Q, R and T in the narrative). Especially actors from the wards stated that 
when the project came into trouble it was very beneficial for their level of trust that the project management 
began to focus on support and on being realistic in their talks about the project. One nurse said: “Actually 
provide support timely to configurators and users” and another urged the management to: “Be realistic – also 
during set-up, test and regarding data”. 
 
The third proposition relates to the demonstration of trust in the actors and hence their self-confidence.  
(3) Take direct action to establish a high level of trust in and around an implementation project. Show 
and demonstrate trust in the actors. Do not overly pin-point, disclose and discuss problems with all 
the actors. Actively work to ensure the actors believe in their own capability to complete their tasks. 
Train and educate actors continuously.  
 
An implementation project anchored in an environment with a high level of trust is effective. When the 
actors’ trust in the project turns to mistrust or reaches a low level several things happen: since initiatives to 
overcome the mistrust are taken overheads are introduced. The implementation project as such becomes less 
able to cope with actors not physically or mentally close to each other, thus being less effective (references T 
and S in the narrative). The top management said, “Believe in the project, also in troubled times” and 
explained the positive experiences when “The directors talked positive about the project”. However, also in 
the present situation the local actors urged the management to “Be ‘open’ about problems” and to “Arrange 
frequent meetings face to face among users, suppliers and project team” to support their belief in their own 
abilities. One group stressed: “Remember to educate super users and configuration team, also when in 
trouble”. 
 
The fourth proposition looks at the concept and importance of success: 
(4) Constantly highlight and even inject frequent small successes. Remember to celebrate successes.  
When actors experience frequent small successes during the implementation project their trust in a successful 
implementation is partly maintained and their self-confidence is reinforced (reference U in the narrative). 
“We need to stage and celebrate successes”, as some department managers said.  
 
  
5 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
During the present analysis we have established a set of lessons learned on how to recover from the 
breakdown of trust during an implementation project by analysing the actions leading from negative 
conditions to positive trust conditions. The lessons learned (formulated above as propositions) can be 
reformulated as concrete actions, which when applied will greatly enhance the chances of reaching the goals 
of the project when in a situation that is challenged by a breakdown of trust: 
1. Introduce, increase and maintain face-to-face events and procedures  
2. Establish (or enhance) a well-functioning support organisation 
3. Assure that the support organisation is always available when needed 
4. Demonstrate trust in the actors to enhance their self-confidence  
5. Celebrate successes, even the smallest or ones injected by yourself 
In this paper we have  
 Augmented existing literature by showing the relations between the lessons learned and the negative 
trust conditions they can assist in solving. 
 Provided recommendations for practice for project managers and alike. 
The study presented in this paper stems from a single longitudinal case study. We claim that the findings are 
a valid of example “generalisation to theory” (Yin, 2003), which can be understood as a combination of 
“theory building” and an “other settings” generalisation. The internal validity has been secured by a strict 
system of coding and reference points. The case presents a typical implementation of an information system 
in a complex but quite well-known setting: a National Health Service set-up. The study is a unique 
longitudinal case covering the entire healthcare system in a country. Furthermore, the constructs analysed in 
the case – trust and the recovery of trust – are not different from those seen in other settings; the only real 
challenge we have identified is related to cultural aspects and the fact that the case is from an island-based 
community that may have its own norms and ways of handling trust. For these reasons it could be interesting 
to broaden this single case study to other situations and cultural settings, or even to focus on cultural-based 
differences of trust relations.  
A natural step forward from the formulation of these four critical success factors would be to develop a 
methodology for measuring the level of trust formally. It would be useful to offer this as a “tool” such that 
the project manager can identify problematic issues and apply guidelines from the recommendations above 
(Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, 2000). It could also be interesting to investigate or test the actions’ relative 
importance or impact in different environments. 
  
References 
Akkermans, H. A. & Helden, K. V. (2002) Vicious and virtuous cycles in ERP implementation: A case study 
of interrelations between critical success factors. European Journal of Information Systems, 11 (1), 35. 
Bullen, C. V. & Rockart, J. F. (1981) A Primer on Critical Success Factors. Working paper (Sloan School of 
Management) ; 1220-81. Report (Alfred P. Sloan School of Management. Center for Information Systems 
Research) ; no. 69. 
Flanagan, J. C. (1954) The critical incident technique. Psychological Bulletin, 51 (4), 327-358. 
Francoise, O., M. Bourgault, Robert Pellegin (2009) ERP implementation through critical success factors’ 
management. Business Process Management Journal, 15 (3), 371-394. 
Gefen, D. (2002). "Nurturing clients' trust to encourage engagement success during the customization of 
ERP systems." Omega 30(4). 
Gefen, D. (2004) What makes an ERP implementation relationship worthwhile: Linking trust mechanisms 
and ERP usefulness. Journal of Management Information Systems, 21 (1), 263, 226, 264 charts, 261 
diagram. 
Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequenses of Modernity. Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Gregor, S. (2006) The nature of theory in information systems. MIS Quarterly, 30 (3), 611-642. 
Komiak, S. Y. X. & Benbasat, I. (2008) A two-process view of trust and distrust building in recomendation 
agents. Journal of the AIS, 9 (12), 727-747. 
Krippendorff, K. (2004) Content Analysis. Thousand Oaks, Sage. 
Jarrar, Y. F., A. Al-Mudimigh, et al. (2000). "ERP implementation critical success factors-the role and 
impact of business process management." International Conference on Management of Innovation and 
Technology 1: 122-127 vol.121. 
Lander, M. C., R. L. Purvis, et al. (2004). "Trust-building mechanisms utilized in outsourced IS development 
projects: a case study." Information & Management 41(4): 509-528. 
Lowe, A. & Locke, J. (2008) Enterprise resource planning and the post bureaucratic organization. 
Information Technology and People, 21 (4), 375-400. 
Nah, F. F.-H. and S. Delgado (2006). "CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS FOR ENTERPRISE RESOURCE 
PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION AND UPGRADE." Journal of Computer Information Systems 47(1): 
99-113. 
Rajiv, S. (1999). "The role of trust in outsourced IS development projects." Commun. ACM 42(2): 80-86. 
Salam, A. F., L. Iyer, et al. (2001). RELATIONSHIP MARKETING AND B2B E-COMMERCE: 
REDEFINING THE TRADITIONAL BUYER- SELLER RELATIONSHIP IN THE DYNAMIC B2B - 
MARKETPLACE ENVIRONMENT. Seventh Americas Conference on Information Systems. 
Schlichter, B. R. (2010) Development of trust during large scale system implementation. Journal of Cases on 
Information Technology, 12 (2) ppp-ppp. 
Schlichter, B. R. & Rose, J. (2009) Analyzing trust perceptions in systems implementations. In: 4th 
Meditteranean Conference on Information Systems, Athens, Greece. 
Scott, J. E. and L. Kaindl (2000). "Enhancing functionality in an enterprise software package." Information 
& Management 37(3): 111-122. 
Somers, T. M. & Nelson, K. G. (2001) The impact of critical success factors across the stages of enterprise 
resource planning implementations. In: Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 10 
pp. 
Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. (1994) Grounded theory methodology. In: Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.) 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, p. 273. Publisher and place 
Sun, A. Y. T., Yazdani, A. et al (2005) Achievement assessment for enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
system implementations based on critical success factors (CSFs). International Journal of Production 
Economics, 98 (2), 189-203. 
Tschannen-Moran, M. & Hoy, W. K. (2000) A multidisciplinary analysis of the nature, meaning, and 
measurement of trust. Review of Educational Research, 70 (4), 547-593. 
Walsham, G. (1993) Interpreting Information Systems in Organisations. Wiley series in information systems. 
Publisher and Place 
Wang, E. T. G. and J. H. F. Chen (2006). "The influence of governance equilibrium on ERP project success." 
Decision Support Systems 41(4): 708-727. 
Yin, R. K. (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage Publications. 
 
 
 
 
 
